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Developments in the Law of Vertical Nonprice
Restrictions: A Welcome Return to The Rule of
Reason
PAUL A. KOCHES*
The Supreme Court of the United States reversed a prior
holding and ruled that nonprice restrictions on competition
among distributors are not a per se violation of section 1 of the
Sherman Act. In so doing, the Court placed significant reliance
on the economic implications of the challenged marketing ar-
rangement. The author explores the Court's increased sensitivity
to marketplace realities in its decision to return to a more flexible
standard of gauging the illegality of vertical restriction schemes.
The business planner is cautioned on possible antitrust pitfalls
resulting from the newly engendered economic efficiency guide-
lines. In conclusion, the reinstatement of a reasonableness ap-
proach is welcomed.
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I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. Early Developments
For almost fifty years after Congress enacted the Sherman Act, I
* J.D., University of Miami School of Law, 1978; former member, University of Miami
Law Review; Associate, Howrey & Simon, Washington, D.C.; member, District of Columbia
Bar.
1. Sherman Antitrust Act of July 2, 1890, ch. 647, § 1, 26 Stat. 209 (current version at
15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976)), The Sherman Act, as amended, provides:
Every contract, combination ... or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or com-
merce among the several States ... is declared to be illegal. Every person who
shall make any contract or engage in any combination or conspiracy hereby de-
clared to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof,
shall be punished by fine not exceeding one million dollars if a corporation, or, if
any other person, one hundred thousand dollars, or by imprisonment not exceed-
ing three years, or by both . . ..
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the legality of vertically restrictive distributional arrangements2 was
uniformly upheld in private antitrust actions.3 Not until the post-
World War II period did the Department of Justice and the Federal
Trade Commission begin to challenge such marketing schemes., In
these early actions, brought against a variety of industries, the cases
normally terminated in consent decrees rather than fullscale trials.5
In 1961, the government was initially successful in its attack on a
closed territory distribution grant in United States v. White Motor
Co.' The district court, holding customer as well as territorial re-
strictions' imposed by manufacturers per se illegal,8 entered a sum-
2. Vertical agreements involve agreements between different levels of the market struc-
ture, specifically, as between a manufacturer and its distributors. In contrast, horizontal
agreements involve competitors at the same level along the marketing chain, for example,
agreements among different manufacturers or distributors. United States v. Arnold, Schwinn
& Co., 388 U.S 365, 372-73, 378-79 (1967); White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253,
261, 263, 267 (1963). See generally Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price
Fixing and Market Division, 75 YALE L.J. 373, 424-29 (1966); Posner, Antitrust Policy and
the Supreme Court: An Analysis of the Restricted Distribution, Horizontal Merger and Poten-
tial Competition Decisions, 75 COLUM. L. Rav. 282, 295 n.50 (1975).
3. See Chicago Sugar Co. v. American Sugar Ref. Co., 176 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1949), cert.
denied, 338 U.S. 948 (1950); Fosburgh v. California & Hawaiian Sugar Ref. Co., 291 F. 29
(9th Cir. 1923); Cole Motor Car Co. v. Hurst, 228 F. 280 (5th Cir. 1915), aff'd sub nom. Tillar
v. Cole Motor Car Co., 246 F. 831 (5th Cir. 1917), cert. denied, 247 U.S. 511 (1918); Phillips
v. Iola Portland Cement Co., 125 F. 593 (8th Cir. 1903), cert. denied, 192 U.S. 606 (1904); P.
Lorillard Co. v. Weingarden, 280 F. 238 (W.D.N.Y. 1922); Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Coca-
Cola Co., 269 F. 796 (D. Del. 1920).
4. In United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707 (1944), the Supreme
Court held that the Sherman Antitrust Act was violated by a price fixing arrangement
whereby wholesalers were required to sell only to retailers licensed by the distributors, who
in turn were bound to sell only to the public at locally prevailing prices. While the Court
stated that price fixing was "unlawful per se," it was indefinite as to whether the per se rule
was applicable to the customer restrictions embodied in the illegal arrangement. Id. at 812.
In 1949, the Department of Justice, relying upon Bausch & Lomb, adopted a position oppos-
ing vertical restrictions including restrictions on territories and customers. L. SULLIvAN,
ANTITRUST 402 (1977).
5. See, e.g., United States v. Lone Star Cadillac Co., 1963 Trade Cas. 70,739 (N.D.
Tex. 1963); United States v. Sperry Rand Corp., 1962 Trade Cas. 70,495 (W.D.N.Y. 1962);
United States v. Shaw-Walker Co., 1962 Trade Cas. 70,491 (W.D.N.Y. 1962); United States
v. Spring-Air Co., 1962 Trade Cas. 70,402 (N.D. Il1. 1962); United States v. Dempster Bros.,
1962 Trade Cas. 70,359 (E.D. Tenn. 1962); United States v. Scott Aviation Corp., 1961
Trade Cas. 70,148 (W.D.N.Y. 1961); United States v. Hamilton Mfg. Co., 1960 Trade Cas.
69,882 (E.D. Wis. 1960); United States v. Rudolph Wurlitzer Co., 1958 Trade Cas. 69,011
(W.D.N.Y. 1958); United States v. Austenal Laboratories, Inc., 1950-51 Trade Cas. 62,880
(S.D.N.Y. 1951).
6. 194 F. Supp. 562 (N.D. Ohio 1961), rev'd, 372 U.S. 253 (1963).
7. Territorial sales restrictions prevent a distributor from selling to customers outside a
geographic area. In contrast, customer restrictions prevent a distributor from selling to cer-
tain customers or specific classes of customers irrespective of the area in which the customer
is located. In White Motor, territorial sales restrictions permitted distributors and dealers to
sell White trucks only to individuals, firms or corporations having places of business and/or
purchasing headquarters within the territory assigned to the distributor or dealer. The cus-
tomer restrictions precluded distributors and dealers from selling trucks to any federal or
[Vol. 33:247
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mary judgment against the defendant. On appeal,9 the Supreme
Court of the United States acknowledged that the vertical nature
of the territorial restrictions presented a case of first impression and
candidly admitted not knowing "enough of the economic and busi-
ness stuff out of which these arrangements emerge."'" Accordingly,
the case was reversed and remanded for trial. Justice Douglas,
speaking for the Court, noted: "We need to know more than we do
about the actual impact of these arrangements on competition to
decide whether they have such a 'pernicious effect on competition
and lack . . . any redeeming virtue' . . . and therefore should be
classified as per se violations of the Sherman Act.""
B. The Schwinn Doctrine
The next opportunity for Supreme Court review of the legality
of restrictions on product distribution arose in United States v.
Arnold, Schwinn & Co.'2 Schwinn, a bicycle manufacturer, experi-
enced substantial deterioration of its leading market position.
Within a decade, Schwinn's firm hold on close to twenty-five per-
cent of the bicycle market had slipped to less than a thirteen percent
share, weakened as a result of stiff competition from other manufac-
turers and mass merchandisers.' 3 In an effort to compete more effec-
tively, Schwinn overhauled its marketing strategy and developed a
complex new distribution network: (1) direct sales to twenty-two
independent wholesale distributors whose resales were restricted to
exclusively allocated territories and only to Schwinn franchised re-
tailers therein;" (2) sales to retailers by means of consignment or
agency arrangements with distributors; and (3) sales to retailers
under the so-called "Schwinn Plan" which involved direct shipment
by Schwinn to retailers, with Schwinn invoicing the retailers and
extending credit and paying a commission to the distributor taking
the order. 5 Dealers were franchised with respect to specifically des-
state government or subdivision thereof as well as to any customer for resale without White
Motor's written consent. Id. at 564-70.
8. Id. at 587.
9. White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963). Direct appeal from the'district
court to the Supreme Court was then authorized by the Expediting Act, ch. 544, § 2, 32 Stat.
823 (1903) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 29 (1976)).
10. 372 U.S. at 263.
11. Id. (citation omitted).
12. 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
13. Among the large competitors were Sears, Roebuck & Co. and Montgomery Ward &
Co. Id. at 369.
14. Id. at 369-71. Throughout this comment, the terms "dealer," "retailer" and
"franchisee" are used synonymously and interchangeably.
15. Id. at 370.
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ignated locations and were authorized to sell Schwinn products only
to consumers and not to unfranchised competing bicycle retailers,
The government brought a civil antitrust action against
Schwinn. After a trial lasting seventy days, the district court con-
cluded that the territorial restraints were unlawful per se when im-
posed on distributors purchasing products from Schwinn, but not
unlawful insofar as they were incident to sales by the manufacturer
itself to franchised retailers where the distributor acted as an agent
or consignee."7 An injunction was granted enjoining those distribu-
tion practices held to be unlawful. 8
Schwinn appealed directly to the Supreme Court, which re-
versed. Expressing the views of five members of the Court," Justice
Fortas perceived the issue as one
raising the fundamental question of the degree to which a manu-
facturer may not only select the customers to whom he will sell,
but also allocate territories for resale and confine access to his
product to selected, or franchised, retailers. We conclude that the
proper application of § 1 of the Sherman Act to this problem
requires differentiation between the situation where the manu-
facturer parts with title, dominion, or risk with respect to the
article, and where he completely retains ownership and risk of
Ioss.20
The Court, finding a material distinction between the two situ-
ations, accordingly judged them under different standards. The rule
of reason was applied in upholding Schwinn's territorial and cus-
tomer restrictions imposed on distributors acting in the capacity as
Schwinn's agents and consignees because Schwinn retained all indi-
cia of ownership of the products (e.g., title, dominion and risk of
loss).2" In contrast, with respect to restrictions on customers to
whom, or territories within which, either distributors or retailers
could resell products purchased outright from Schwinn, the Court
apparently found a per se violation. In what was to become oft-
quoted language, Justice Fortas wrote: "Under the Sherman Act, it
16. Id. at 370-71. A breach of this requirement would cause a "communicated danger of
termination" by Schwinn to the offending franchisee. Id. at 372.
17. United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 237 F. Supp. 323, 342-43 (N.D. I1. 1965).
18. Id. at 343.
19. Justice Stewart, joined by Justice Harlan, concurred in part and dissented in part
in a separate opinion. Justices Clark and White took no part in the decision of the case.
United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 392 (1967).
20. Id. at 378-79.
21. The Court stated: "When we look to the product market as a whole, we cannot
conclude that Schwinn's franchise system with respect to products as to which it restrains
ownership and risk constitutes an unreasonable restraint of trade." Id. at 382.
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is unreasonable without more for a manufacturer to seek to restrict
and confine areas or persons with whom an article may be traded
after the manufacturer has parted with dominion over it.""
II. THE RESPONSE TO Schwinn: A CRITIQUE OF THE MEANING AND
WISDOM OF THE PER SE RULE
Considerable legal commentary ensued, raising doubts as to the
meaning and scope of the mandate of the Schwinn Court, as well
as impugning its wisdom.23 Indeed, one rancorous observer bluntly
characterized the Schwinn decision as "the most egregious error in
all of antitrust. ' 2 4
The controversy focused primarily on the issues of (1) whether
Schwinn did, in fact, stand for a strict per se rule against vertical
restraints imposed by manufacturers without title, and, more fun-
damentally, (2) if so, whether the application of a per se standard
in such a market context was justified.
As to the first point, the specific debate had seized upon the
significance of Justice Fortas' phrase "without more. 25 It had been
suggested that rather than creating a blanket per se prohibition, this
language merely invalidated vertical restraints of the Schwinn genre
absent an acceptable business justification. 2 In addition, a degree
of contextual ambiguity had been inferred from the juxtaposition in
the opinion of the "without more" language to multiple references
to a classic rule of reason analysis. 27
Nevertheless, a reading of certain unequivocal passages else-
where in the Schwinn opinion should have resolved any ambiguities
22. Id. at 379 (emphasis added). The rationale stated by Justice Fortas to support this
conclusion was that such a practice would violate "the ancient rule against restraints on
alienation" of property. Id. at 380. As one might expect, this reasoning was severely criticized
as irrelevant to antitrust regulation. See notes 34-36 and accompanying text infra.
23. For a representative sampling, see McLaren, Marketing Limitations on Independent
Distributors and Dealers-prices, Territories, Customers, and Handling of Competitive
Products, 13 ANTrrRUST BULL. 161, 166-71 (1968); Orrick, Marketing Restrictions Imposed to
Protect the Integrity of "Franchise" Distribution Systems, 36 ANTITRUsT L.J. 63, 69-72 (1967);
Panel Discussion, Restraints in Distribution: General Motors, Sealy and Schwinn, 36
ANTTRrUST L.J. 84 (1967); Posner, supra note 2, at 283-99; Robinson, Recent Antitrust Devel-
opments: 1974, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 243, 270-81 (1975); Note, 70 MICH. L. REv. 616 (1972); 1975
DUKE L.J. 935; Comment, The Impact of the Schwinn Case on Territorial Restrictions, 46
TEX. L. REv. 497, 511-12 (1968). For a more inclusive list of articles and comments, see GTE
Sylvania Inc. v. Continental T.V., Inc., 537 F.2d 980, 988 n.13 (9th Cir. 1976).
24. Handler, Twenty-five Years of Antitrust, 73 COLUM. L. REv. 415, 458 (1973).
25. United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. at 379.
26. See, e.g., Scooper Dooper, Inc. v. Kraftco Corp., 494 F.2d 840, 846 n.13 (3d Cir. 1974).
See generally Note, supra note 23.
27. See ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, MONOGRAPH No. 2, VEaTcMAL REsTRicTiONS LIMMNG
INTRABRAND COMPETTON 12 n.33 (1977).
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in favor of a strict per se interpretation. For instance, the sentence
immediately succeeding the "without more" phrase forcefully
states: "Such restraints are so obviously destructive of competition
that their mere existence is enough.""8 Of more importance is the
Court's concluding language, reiterating the holding of Schwinn:
Once the manufacturer has parted with title and risk, he has
parted with dominion over the product, and his effort thereafter
to restrict territory or persons to whom the product may be trans-
ferred-whether by explicit agreement or by silent combination
or understanding with his vendee-is a per se violation of § 1 of
the Sherman Act."
Despite the apparent per se mandate of Schwinn, lower courts
had resisted following it. ° Instead, the opinion was construed as
requiring a demonstration of "firm and resolute" enforcement by
the manufacturer of the challenged territorial or customer restric-
tion as an "element" of the per se violation.3' Other decisions con-
trived dubious factual distinctions in an effort to circumscribe the
Schwinn holding to its allegedly "unique" circumstances." In short,
28. 388 U.S. at 379.
29. Id. at 382.
30. Apart from the GTE Sylvania case, discussed in greater detail infra, other decisions
refusing to interpret Schwinn as creating a broad per se rule against vertical territorial
restraints include: Venzie Corp. v. United States Mineral Prods. Co., 521 F.2d 1309 (3d Cir.
1975); American Motor Inns, Inc. v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 521 F.2d 1230 (3d Cir. 1975); Scooper
Dooper, Inc. v. Kraftco Corp., 494 F.2d 840, 847 n.13 (3d Cir. 1974); Good Inv. Promotions,
Inc. v. Corning Glass Works, 493 F.2d 891 (6th Cir. 1974); Anderson v. American Auto. Ass'n,
454 F.2d 1240, 1244 (9th Cir. 1972); Tripoli Co. v. Wella Corp., 425 F.2d 932 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 831 (1970); Janel Sales Corp. v. Lanvin Parfums, Inc., 396 F.2d 398, 406
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 938 (1968); Sulmeyer v. Seven-Up Co., 411 F. Supp. 635, 641-
42 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Jack Winter, Inc. v. Koratron Co., 375 F. Supp. 1, 62-63 (N.D. Cal. 1974).
31. See, e.g., Redd v. Shell Oil Co., 524 F.2d 1054, 1057-58 (10th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
425 U.S. 912 (1976); Reed Bros. v. Monsanto Co., 525 F.2d 486, 495 (8th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 1055 (1976); World of Sleep, Inc. v. Stearns & Foster Co., 525 F.2d 40, 44
(10th Cir. 1975); Good Inv. Promotions, Inc. v. Corning Glass Works, 493 F.2d 891, 893 (6th
Cir. 1974); Colorado Pump & Supply Co. v. Febco, Inc., 472 F.2d 637, 639 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 411 U.S. 987 (1973); Janel Sales Corp. v. Lanvin Parfums, Inc., 396 F.2d 398, 406
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 938 (1968); Sulmeyer v. Seven-Up Co., 411 F. Supp. 635
(S.D.N.Y. 1976); United States v. Empire Gas Corp., 393 F. Supp. 903 (W.D. Mo. 1975),
aff'd, 537 F.2d 296 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1122 (1977); Fairfield County
Beverage Distribs., Inc. v. Narragansett Brewing Co., 378 F. Supp. 376 (D. Conn. 1974);
Todhunter-Mitchell & Co. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 375 F. Supp. 610, 625-26 (E.D. Pa.),
modified, 383 F. Supp. 586 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
The precedential support for the enforcement prerequisite is rooted, in part, in the
Schwinn Court's express recognition of the district court's finding that "Schwinn has been
'firm and resolute' in insisting upon observance of territorial and customer limitations." 388
U.S. at 372. See generally, 31 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 643 (1974).
32. See, e.g., Venzie Corp. v. United States Mineral Prods. Co., 521 F.2d 1309 (3d Cir.
1975); Blankenship v. Hearst Corp., 519 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1975); Wilson v. I.B.E. Indus.,
Inc., 510 F.2d 986 (5th Cir. 1975). See also Beltronics, Inc. v. Eberline Instrument Corp., 509
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the force of the Schwinn doctrine was partially eroded by the courts,
but not without committing judicial acts of violence to logic and
intellectual integrity.
The second, and perhaps more essential problem posed by
Schwinn was not so much interpreting the meaning of its language,
but rather accepting the validity of its proposition.33
Under the Schwinn rationale, the factor determinative of legal-
ity was the form of the transaction in the vertical marketing chain.
In the event manufacturers sold their products to the distributors,
the former had no defense to antitrust liability for any restraint
imposed on the distributor's ability to resell. On the other hand,
where distributors acted as agents or consignees, manufacturers
would be permitted to present legitimate business justifications for
limitations on resales. Thus, the Schwinn doctrine produced sharply
contrasting results depending upon the role played by the distribu-
tor within the marketing system.
The curious distinction between agency/consignment and inde-
pendent sale transactions was expressly premised on "the ancient
rule against restraints on alienation"" of property. Indeed, Justice
Fortas' position had been widely assailed as both entirely unrelated
to the competitive effects of the restraint as well as irrelevant to the
proper purposes of the antitrust laws." For example, in Professor
Posner's critique of Schwinn, he wrote:
[Tihe common law of restraint of trade was not a product of
concern with promoting competition and was not enacted into
federal law by the Sherman Act; there is no occasion to consider
what a nineteenth-century judge interpreting a confusing body of
English precedents would have done if confronted by methods of
distribution unknown in his time."
F.2d 1316 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1000 (1975).
33. Schwinn, as Justice Powell pointed out in GTE Sylvania, "was an abrupt and largely
unexplained departure from White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963)." Conti-
nental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc. 433 U.S. 36, 47 (1977). See also notes 9-11 and
accompanying text supra.
34. United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. at 380.
35. The rule was described in Justice Stewart's dissent in Schwinn as a "wooden and
irrelevant formula." Id. at 394. See, e.g., Handler, The Twentieth Annual Antitrust Re-
view-1967, 53 VA. L. REv. 1667, 1684-86 (1967); Pollock, The Schwinn Per Se Rule: The Case
of Reconsideration, 44 ANTIRrUST L.J. 557 (1975); Robinson, supra note 23, at 270-71.
36. Posner, supra note 2, at 296; accord, Eastex Aviation, Inc. v. Sperry & Hutchinson
Co., 522 F.2d 1299, 1306 (5th Cir. 1975) (applying Schwinn per se rule, but stating: "Ancient
rules of property law should not be made the basis for determining the application of modern
rules of antitrust law.").
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III. THE RESURRECTION OF THE RULE OF REASON
A. Continental T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc.
Against this background, a case arose which would ultimately
put in issue the continuing vitality of the Schwinn doctrine. GTE
Sylvania Inc.,37 a manufacturer of television sets, adopted a new
franchise plan3" in 1962 which limited the number of franchises
granted in any given geographic area and imposed a requirement
upon each franchise to sell Sylvania products only from the location
or locations at which it was franchised." Continental T.V., Inc.,4" a
retailer, prospered under the Sylvania plan, but later cancelled a
large order in protest of Sylvania's proposed new franchise which
was to be located in close proximity to one of Continental's retail
outlets. A general deterioration of business relations ensued," cul-
minating in Sylvania's termination of Continental's franchise.
Subsequently, Continental brought an antitrust suit against
Sylvania42 predicated upon the vertically restrictive franchise sys-
tem. The cross-complaint alleged that "Sylvania had violated § 1
of the Sherman Act by entering into and enforcing franchise agree-
ments that prohibited the sale of Sylvania products other than from
specified locations."43 At trial, Sylvania introduced evidence dem-
onstrating that its franchising policy of selective distribution was
absolutely essential to Sylvania's survival as a viable competitor in
the television industry." The case was submitted to the jury by
37. Hereinafter referred to as "Sylvania." Sylvania, a corporate subsidiary of General
Telephone and Electric, manufactured and sold television sets through its Home Entertain-
ment Products Division. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 38 (1977).
38. The plan was prompted by a decline in Sylvania's market share to an insignificant
one to two percent of national television sales. Id. at 38.
39. An acknowledged purpose of the change was to decrease the number of competing
Sylvania retailers in the hope of attracting the more aggressive retailers which was thought
necessary for the improvement of the company's market position. The plan yielded positive
results during the time period at issue. By 1965, Sylvania's market share increased to five
percent and the company ranked as the nation's eighth largest manufacturer of color televi-
sion sets. Id. at 39.
40. Hereinafter referred to as "Continental." In fact, there were four corporate petition-
ers: Continental T.V., Inc.; A & G Sales; Sylpac, Inc.; and S.A.M. Indus., Inc. All four
conducted business under the trade style of "Continental TV." Id. at 39 n.5. Continental
was one of Sylvania's most successful dealers in the San Francisco area. Id. at 39.
41. Among other things, Sylvania's credit line was withdrawn. This precipitated Conti-
nental's withholding of payments due to a finance company handling credit arrangements
between Continental and Sylvania. Id. at 39-40.
42. Actually, the antitrust issues were raised in cross-claims brought by Continental
against Sylvania in a diversity action filed by Sylvania's finance company against Continen-
tal seeking recovery of money owed and secured merchandise. Id. at 40.
43. Id.
44. GTE Sylvania Inc. v. Continental T.V., Inc., 537 F.2d 980, 982 n.2 (9th Cir. 1976)
(en banc).
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special interrogatories with instructions virtually precluding the
jury from finding in favor of Sylvania on the critical issue of whether
the location clause constituted a per se violation of the Sherman Act
under the Schwinn rule.4" Consequently, Continental prevailed and
the court assessed treble damages against Sylvania."
On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit, an en banc panel reversed the judgment below. 7 The appel-
late court distinguished Schwinn on a number of factual grounds in
a strenuous effort to circumvent a per se condemnation of the Syl-
vania plan." Writing for the majority, Judge Ely contrasted the
nature of the restrictions imposed by Schwinn with those imposed
by Sylvania, 9 their resultant economic effects,50 and each manufac-
turer's respective market power,5 concluding that Sylvania's distri-
bution practices did not pose the same anticompetitive potential as
did those condemned in Schwinn. Accordingly, the panel held "that
the just result in the present controversy is not absolutely foreor-
45. See id. at 985 n.6. Interestingly, the trial judge in the case was the late Associate
Justice Tom C. Clark (Ret.), sitting by designation in the district court. Scrutinizing his jury
instructions which were assigned as error on appeal, the Ninth Circuit observed: "Justice
Clark apparently adopted some of his own dissenting comments in White Motor Co. v. United
States . . .. There, the majority of the Court, against the will of Mr. Justice Clark, declined
to establish a broad per se rule regarding all vertical territorial restraints." Id. at 987 n.10
(citations omitted).
46. Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976), the district judge entered judgment of treble
damages against Sylvania in the amount of $1,774,515 and awarded Continental attorney's
fees in the sum of $275,000. 537 F.2d at 986.
47. 537 F.2d at 1004. The majority and dissenting opinions of the first panel hearing the
appeal, unofficially reported in 1974-1 Trade Cas. 75,072 (9th Cir. 1974), were withdrawn
pending the rehearing en banc. 537 F.2d 982 n.1.
48. 537 F.2d at 989-92. See also notes 30-32 and accompanying text supra.
49. "Schwinn involved a restriction on the location and types of permissible vendees,
while Sylvania only imposed restrictions on the permissible locations of vendors." 537 F.2d
at 990 (emphasis by the court).
50. In Schwinn a wholesale distributor was foreclosed from selling Schwinn
products to any purchaser located outside his exclusive territory; thus, intrabrand
competition (i.e., competition between sellers of the same brand) was wholly
destroyed. A potential purchaser of Schwinn products at the wholesale level could
look to only one source of the product-the authorized dealer for his territory. No
other wholesaler could compete by offering a lower price or better service to the
same purchaser. In marked contrast, Sylvania franchised at least two dealers in
the major markets and each Sylvania dealer was free to sell to any buyer he
chose-preserving intrabrand competition and allowing to every potential pur-
chaser of Sylvania products a reasonable choice between several competing deal-
ers.
Id. (emphasis by the court).
51. "Schwinn had an extremely large share of the bicycle market. Sylvania's market
share, however, was so small when it adopted its locations practice that it was threatened
with expulsion from the television market." Id. at 991. See also text accompanying note 44
supra.
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dained by Schwinn, and that a rule of reason analysis should have
been applied."5
On certiorari review, the Supreme Court affirmed in a six to two
decision." The Court, however, rejected the Ninth Circuit's strained
distinctions, finding the language of Schwinn "clearly broad enough
to apply to the present case."5 Justice Powell, author of the major-
ity opinion, set the tone for the Court's analysis: "Unlike the Court
of Appeals, however, we are unable to find a principled basis for
distinguishing Schwinn .... ,5 Indeed, Sylvania had urged the
Court that if Schwinn could not be distinguished then it should be
critically reconsidered. The Court agreed, convinced of the need for
clarification of the antitrust law of distributional restrictions."
Mindful of the great weight of scholarly and judicial indict-
ments of the Schwinn doctrine,57 Justice Powell premised his review
of the case before the Court on the observation that the rule of
52. 537 F.2d at 1003. In so holding, the majority sought to further what it construed to
be the congressional intent behind the Sherman Act-the promotion of consumer welfare
through a competitive economy. Id. at 1003-04. In contrast, Judge Browning's dissent inter-
preted Schwinn as a proper prohibition of restrictions upon the autonomy of independent
businessmen. As such, Browning argued, Schwinn was consistent with a principal concern of
antitrust regulation. Id. at 1018-22. For a more detailed discussion of the conflicting policy
considerations under the antitrust laws, see notes 116-27 and accompanying text infra.
53. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977). Justice White filed
a separate opinion, in which he concurred with the judgment of the other five members of
the majority. Id. at 59. Justice Brennan, with whom Justice Marshall joined, filed a brief
dissenting opinion. Id. at 71. Justice Rehnquist took no part in the consideration or decision
of the case. Id. at 59.
54. Id. at 46.
55. Id. Comparing the focus of the marketing practices in Schwinn with that in Sylvania,
the majority agreed with the Ninth Circuit that the former system was intended to limit
available retail customers, whereas the latter dealt with territorial restraints. See also note
49 and accompanying text supra. That distinction was found to be without a real difference
and, in the words of the majority, "irrelevant to functional anti-trust analysis." 433 U.S. at
46. Significantly, the Court deferred to the enlightened phraseology of Chief Justice Hughes
in Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 360, 377 (1933): "Realities must
dominate judgment. . . . The Anti-Trust Act aims at substance." 433 U.S. at 47.
56. Id. at 47. Of course, Schwinn was supported by, if nothing else, the principle of stare
decisis. Later in the opinion, however, Justice Powell made the following comment about the
value of precedent:
The importance of stare decisis is of course, unquestioned, but as Mr. Justice
Frankfurter stated in Helvering v. Hallock . . . "stare decisis is a principle of
policy and not a mechanical formula of adherence to the latest decision, however
recent and questionable, when such adherence involves collision with a prior
doctrine more embracing in its scope, intrinsically sounder, and verified by expe-
rience."
Id. at 58 n.30 (citations omitted). It is noteworthy to contrast the position taken by Justice
White, who refused, in his concurrence in judgment, to endorse the overruling of Schwinn,
arguing that "considerations of stare decisis are to be given particularly strong weight in the
area of statutory construction." Id. at 60. See also text accompanying note 77 infra.
57. 433 U.S. at 48-49 nn.13 & 14. See also notes 23-36 and accompanying text supra.
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reason is the prevailing standard of analysis under the Sherman
Act.5" In so doing, the Court expressly reaffirmed its earlier position
that per se rules are appropriate only in circumstances where the
conduct complained of is "manifestly anticompetitive."5 Finding
the reasoning in Schwinn fatally erroneous in a number of respects,
its per se rule was overturned." For those academicians still debat-
ing the meaning and wisdom of the Schwinn doctrine, the dispute
was finally resolved simply and authoritatively in GTE Sylvania.
Schwinn had indeed stated a per se rule against territorial and
customer restrictions but, as such, it was wrong.
B. The Court's Economic Analysis
The Court prefaced its economic analysis with the general ob-
servation that the potential market effect of any restrictive distribu-
tional system is the simultaneous reduction of intrabrand competi-
tion and stimulation of interbrand competition. 1 In a significant
footnote, the Court added that "interbrand competition is the
primary concern of antitrust law." 2 Criticizing Schwinn for its inept
treatment of economics, the GTE Sylvania Court noted the conspic-
uous absence of "even an assertion in the [Schwinn] opinion that
the competitive impact of vertical restrictions is significantly af-
fected by the form of the transaction." 3 Elaborating, Justice Powell
58. 433 U.S. at 49. The Court at this juncture footnoted to what is perhaps the broadest
statement of the rule of reason:
The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regu-
lates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may
suppress or even destroy competition. To determine that question the court must
ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint is
applied; its condition before and after the restraint was imposed; the nature of
the restraint and its effect, actual or probable. The history of the restraint, the
evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting the particular remedy, the purpose
or end sought to be attained, are all relevant facts. This is not because a good
intention will save an otherwise objectionable regulation or the reverse; but be-
cause knowledge of intent may help the court to interpret facts and to predict
consequences.
Id. at 49 n.15 (quoting Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918)).
59. 433 U.S. at 50. The classic expression of the per se rationale is found in Northern
Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958): "There are certain agreements or practices
which because of their pernicious effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are
conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as
to the precise harm they caused or the business excuse for their use."
60. 433 U.S. at 59.
61. Id. at 51-52. Stated simply, interbrand competition is competition among the manu-
facturers of the same generic product, for example, television sets. In contrast, intrabrand
competition is competition among the distributors, either at a wholesale or retail level, in
marketing the product of a particular manufacturer.
62. Id. at 52 n.19 (emphasis supplied).
63. Id. at 54.
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observed incredulously that Schwinn supported its exclusion of non-
sale transactions from its per se mandate "not because of a greater
danger of intrabrand harm or a greater promise of interbrand bene-
fit, but rather because of the Court's unexplained belief that a com-
plete per se prohibition would be too 'inflexible."' 6
The Court's analytical focus, then, was clear from the outset.
Actual competitive effect in the interbrand marketplace was
deemed the essential touchstone for antitrust scrutiny of distribu-
tional plans imposed by manufacturers. This approach was applied
even though vertical restrictions naturally tend to reduce intra-
brand competition by limiting the number of sellers of a given prod-
uct competing for the business of a given aggregate of buyers. 5 The
potential exploitative power of retailers, however, within their as-
signed geographic market is always checked by consumer mobility,
specifically, the ability of buyers to travel to other franchised terri-
tories to purchase the same brand at a competitive price.6 In addi-
tion, the existence and availability of reasonable substitute prod-
ucts, depending on cross-elasticity of consumer demand and the
absence of a manufacturer's outright product market, serves as a
check on retailer market power. 7
Nevertheless, under the GTE Sylvania rule of reason, the dis-
tributional system's adverse impact on intrabrand competition, if
any, must be balanced against the benefits accruing to interbrand
competition; if the scale tips in favor of the latter, the system is legal
under section 1 of the Sherman Act. Plainly, vertical restrictions
may significantly stimulate interbrand competition by facilitating
certain efficiencies in distribution which are otherwise unfeasible in
a purely competitive intrabrand market.6 Among these is the incen-
64. Id. (citing United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 379 (1967)).
65. 433 U.S. at 54.
66. Id. The Court's observation is basically sound, with one minor qualification. The
prices of territorially restricted dealers could indeed exceed the competitive level, but only
by an amount equal to or less than the additional costs incurred by consumers in traveling
to the nearest competitively priced dealer.
67. Id. at 52 n.19. The Court also mentioned that neither of these variables-consumer
mobility or substitute products-is affected by the form of the transaction between any of
the links in the chain of distribution. Id. at 54.
68. Id. at 54, 55 (citing Preston, Restrictive Distribution Arrangements: Economic Anal-
ysis and Public Policy Standards, 30 LAw & CoNTzmP. PROB. 506, 511 (1965)). Although the
analysis of GTE Sylvania is extensively couched in economic terms, the Court also footnoted
various noneconomic reasons supporting vertical restrictions. For example, a manufacturer
may wish to exert control over the manner in which his product is sold and serviced because
of a concern for the safety and quality of the product. Furthermore, beyond its own notions
of public responsibility, federal and state laws impose stringent requirements upon producers
in this regard. E.g., Consumer Product Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2051-81 (1976); Consumer
Product Warranties Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-12 (1976); CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 1790-96 (West 1973).
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tive for new entrant manufacturers to use restrictive systems "in
order to induce competent and aggressive retailers to make the kind
of investment of capital and labor that is often required in the
distribution of products unknown to the consumer.""
In the case of established producers, the Court pointed out that
distributional efficiency is enhanced by vertical restraints because
they operate to foster competition at the retail level in the "special
services" market. Manufacturers can seek to include in their fran-
chising agreements, such as the Sylvania plan, provisions requiring
that retailers provide service and repair facilities or engage in pro-
motional and advertising campaigns. Promotional and repair serv-
ices, the Court observed, may be vital to the successful marketing
of certain products in a competitive industry. 0 As Justice Powell
aptly stated: "The availability and quality of such services affect a
manufacturer's goodwill and the competitiveness of his product."7'
A concurrent benefit of territorial or customer restraints in a
marketing scheme is the effective elimination of the "free-rider"
syndrome. This effect is seen where, in a purely competitive intra-
brand market, a certain proportion of competing dealers are in-
clined to forego providing services, with the obvious purpose of sav-
ing money. The result is a two-fold market imperfection: (1) those
recalcitrant dealers get the benefits of the service-enhanced goodwill
of the franchised trademark without undertaking the costs; and (2)
this group may also cut prices to attract purchasing customers away
from the service-competitive franchisees while directing the same
consumers to the competitors for repairs, exchanges, etc.7" Thus,
such incentives are minimized when only a limited number of deal-
ers were franchised in a given location.
The Court further assumed, in support of presumptive legality
of vertical restraints, that there is a general interest on the part of
manufacturers in maintaining optimal levels of intrabrand competi-
tion in both services and price.73 One could expect that the lower the
retail price, the greater the volume of sales and the higher the total
amount of manufacturer revenues."
69. 433 U.S. at 55.
70. Id. The Court suggested that service and repair areessential when marketing such
products as automobiles and major household appliances and, apparently included within the
latter group, television sets. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. See generally Posner, supra note 2, at 285.
73. That is, to the extent consistent with the efficient distribution of their products. 433
U.S. at 56 (citing Bork, supra note 2, at 403 and Posner, supra note 2, at 283, 287-88).
74. See Note, Vertical Restraints: Enforcement of Resale Location Is a Per Se Violation
of Section One of the Sherman Act, 88 HARv. L. REv. 636, 641 (1975).
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Summarizing his discussion of the economics of distributional
restraints, Justice Powell reiterated: "[T]here is substantial schol-
arly and judicial authority supporting their economic utility. There
is relatively little authority to the contrary.""
In short, the almost universal disparagement of the Schwinn
per se doctrine was, in GTE Sylvania, accorded the ultimate judi-
cial sanction. Justice Powell sounded the death knell for Schwinn
with the following forceful language:
Certainly, there has been no showing in this case, either generally
or with respect to Sylvania's agreements, that vertical restric-
tions have or are likely to have a "pernicious effect on competi-
tion" or that they "lack. . .any redeeming virtue." Accordingly,
we conclude that the per se rule stated in Schwinn must be over-
ruled. In so holding we do not foreclose the possibility that par-
ticular applications of vertical restrictions might justify per se
prohibition under Northern Pac. R. Co. But we do make clear
that departure from the rule-of-reason must be based upon
demonstrative economic effects rather than-as in Schwinn-
upon formalistic line drawing."6
Concurring in the result, Justice White argued that Schwinn
should be distinguished rather than overruled. His opinion adopted
many of the distinctions offered by the Ninth Circuit majority
below. Most significantly, he contended that the potential for en-
hanced interbrand competition coupled with Sylvania's insubstan-
tial market power sufficiently differentiated the two cases to permit
the Schwinn rule to stand."
IV. CONCLUSION: THE IMPLICATIONS OF GTE Sylvania
Ironically, the sweeping GTE Sylvania decision may well
spawn an even greater volume of commentary than did Schwinn.
Clearly, GTE Sylvania stands as a watershed in the law of vertical
relationships. Perhaps most interesting are the theoretical implica-
tions of GTE Sylvania for future developments in antitrust law, as
well as the practical ramifications of the decision for antitrust litiga-
tion and for business planning.
A. Business Planning
Prior to GTE Sylvania, business counselors could offer confi-
dent advice to their clients concerning the effect of vertical location
75. 433 U.S. at 57-58.
76. Id. at 58-59 (emphasis supplied) (citations omitted).
77. Id. at 59-60.
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and customer restrictions under the clearly delineated boundaries
of the Schwinn doctrine. Now, in the wake of GTE Sylvania, busi-
ness advisors tread in unchartered waters, guided only by a single
buoy of "reasonableness." Moreover, GTE Sylvania teaches that
reasonableness is determined primarily by the net benefit to inter-
brand competition. Such determinations are difficult to predict for
a manufacturer contemplating the adoption of a radically different
restrictive distributional plan.
Thus, in order to minimize the risk of antitrust liability, manu-
facturers considering such plans should prudently consider and doc-
ument legitimate marketing reasons for doing so. They should focus
on goals of increased efficiency, meeting interbrand competition in
the special services area, or inducing investment on the part of
retailers. As such, should the restriction come under antitrust at-
tack, the competition-minded manufacturer would be in a better
position to demonstrate a "redeeming virtue" justifying his market-
ing practices.78
It is crucial, therefore, that the manufacturer clearly and ex-
plicitly record evidence demonstrating that the restraint is neces-
sary but ancillary to some legitimate business purpose, designed
with the ultimate objective of promoting competition.
Business planners would be well advised to conduct empirical
studies on the nature of intrabrand, and more importantly, inter-
brand competition in the particular product market.7 At the outset,
the manufacturer should consult expert economic advice to assess
the competitive ramifications of any distributional plan under con-
sideration. After effectuation of the plan, the actual responses in
terms of competitive effects should be closely monitored in the ini-
tial stages of its implementation. All relevant data demonstrative
of fluctuations in interbrand competition should be diligently re-
corded. Of course, in the eventuality of a significant decline in com-
petition, the utility of the plan might be reconsidered in light of
potential antitrust scrutiny.
Most importantly, manufacturers must be careful not to im-
pose restrictions on distribution in response to concerted dealer
pressures. Vertical restraints imposed at the behest of a group of
78. Id. at 54. Justice Powell noted that "[t]hese 'redeeming virtues' are implicit in every
decision sustaining vertical restrictions under the rule of reason." Id.
79. After GTE Sylvania, courts should consider all forms of competition, including pric-
ing, advertising, promotional campaigning and providing services. In addition, an analysis
of the structural factors which facilitate competition in a market might be helpful, notably
seller concentration, buyer concentration, product differentiation and barriers to entry. See
generally J. BAIN, INDUSTRIAL ORGO IZAInoN 7 (2d ed. 1968).
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retailers will not be accorded any justification in rebuttal to a sec-
tion 1 attack. Rather, GTE Sylvania expressly reaffirmed the per se
prohibition of horizonal agreements dividing markets or restricting
competition among competitors." Finally, to forestall possible alle-
gations of a dealer cartel, vertically restrictive manufacturers
should bargain adamantly for clauses in their franchise agreements
providing for rigorous enforcement of the location and customer
limitations imposed on dealers.
B. Litigation: Effects on Volume and Strategy
The overruling of the Schwinn per se rule and the substitution
of the GTE Sylvania rule of reason invites speculation as to its
impact on the nature of litigation and the number of cases that will
follow.
The most obvious change for litigants is the change in focus to
the market effects test. To what degree this shift will affect the net
volume of antitrust litigation, however, is presently unclear. On one
hand, such proceedings will inevitably involve a balancing of com-
plex economic factors probative of competitive reasonableness. The
use of economists and other expert witnesses at trial will certainly
increase. Problems of discovery and proof under rule of reason litiga-
tion will certainly mushroom, becoming more costly and complex,
and thus requiring stricter court supervision. The end result might
be massive and protracted trials, aggravating already crowded court
dockets.
On the other hand, the number of antitrust attacks launched
against distribution-restricting manufacturers may decline follow-
ing GTE Sylvania. Prior to this decision, a simple prima facie case
showing the mere existence of a restraint satisfied the Schwinn re-
quirement for liability."' Antitrust plaintiffs are naturally attracted
to the per se cases where the alleged offense has been previously
established as a "pernicious act." This is because the application
of a per se standard significantly lightens their burden while the
potential recovery of treble damages provides a tempting incentive
to litigate.
80. 433 U.S. at 58 n.28. See also United States v. Topco Assoc., Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972);
United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127 (1966). For a critical analysis of Topco
which concludes that the rationale in Topco is totally obliterated by the teachings of GTE
Sylvania, see text accompanying notes 87-100 infra.
81. Of course, plaintiffs always had to prove standing and injury. Standards imposed on
plaintiffs in these two respects have become increasingly more rigorous as a result of recent
antitrust decisions, the subject of which is neither crucial to nor within the scope of this
comment.
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GTE Sylvania fails to distribute the burdens of proof between
the plaintiff and the defendant, thus creating a great deal of uncer-
tainty. Until it is resolved, the prudent plaintiff should be pre-
pared to prove affirmatively the illegal purpose and effect of the
restraint or, at bare minimum, to rebut contrary contentions of the
defendant.
In short, while GTE Sylvania provides a certain disincentive for
plaintiffs to litigate, those cases which are inevitably brought under
its purview are likely to involve complicated questions of fact and
consequently will engender greater costs to litigants and to courts.
Additionally, GTE Sylvania suggests new strategic considerations
in the prosecution of distributional cases. To reiterate, the GTE
Sylvania Court expressly limited its rule of reason holding to non-
price vertical restraints. 2 Mindful of the still viable per se prohibi-
tion against pricing maintenance," plaintiffs might be inclined to
allege that the underlying purpose of the manufacturer's distribu-
tion plan is simply to fix prices. Where a preponderance of the
evidence demonstrates such an objective, an otherwise apparently
reasonable territory or customer restraint may well be rendered in-
defensible.
Alternatively, plaintiffs could argue, even in the absence of the
manufacturer's illegal intent, that the effect of the restrictions was
nevertheless a stabilization of prices. This position is problematical,
however, since GTE Sylvania is silent regarding the extent to which
a reasonable distributional restraint may tangentially affect prices
before crossing the line into the realm of illegality, per se or other-
wise .8
82. 433 U.S. at 51 n.18.
83. E.g., Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968); Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E.
Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211 (1951).
84. Other significant questions remain open as well. For instance, under the newly fash-
ioned standard of reasonableness against which locations and customer restrictions are to be
measured, it is unclear to what degree a manufacturer must establish a "redeeming virtue"
justifying the restraint. The specific factors to be considered were not delineated in the GTE
Sylvania opinion. Normally, the purpose and nature of the restraint, the business context in
which it was imposed and the market impact which results are all important. For a classic
expression of the rule of reason, see Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231
(1918), quoted in note 58 supra.
Manufacturers no doubt would want to demonstrate that the restraints enhance distribu-
tional efficiencies, but it is uncertain whether such a showing, standing alone, could justify
any given restraint. Does the burden, thereafter, shift to the plaintiff to prove adverse inter-
brand market effect? Or should the defendant, rather, carry the burden of demonstrating a
net benefit to interbrand competition?
Additionally, the GTE Sylvania Court apparently accorded no independent significance
to the market power of the challenged firm. The anxiety expressed by Justice White in his
concurring opinion concerning the Court's failure to analyze the effect of relative market
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C. Antitrust Analysis in the Future
Apart from the specific message of GTE Sylvania to the busi-
ness community and to antitrust litigants, the case provides instruc-
tive insight into the Court's philosophical and methodological
perspective of antitrust jurisprudence. GTE Sylvania stands, econo-
mists would hasten to say, as a prelude to the further refinement of
judicial economic analysis of Sherman Act cases incorporating eco-
nomic maxims into functional legal rules. Perhaps the greatest sig-
nificance of the decision then, lies in the Court's pronouncement of
the "functional antitrust" analytical framework.u Underlying this
approach, the Court premised its holding on the philosophy of eco-
nomic realism and resolved the problem before it without regard to
the artificial labelling of formalism, but rather with a real concern
for the impact on actual competition in the market place."
The extension of the rule of reason analysis in GTE Sylvania
indicates a fresh willingness by the Supreme Court (as well as a
directive to lower courts) to consider economic evidence in adjudi-
cating antitrust claims. As such, the case marks a fundamental shift
in position from that taken by the Court not so long ago in United
States v. Topco Associates, Inc."
Topco was a cooperative association consisting of twenty-three
small and medium sized regional supermarket chains and two
retailer-owned wholesale facilities which operated in thirty-three
states." Each store was independently run under its own name.
Topco's only function was that of purchasing agent. The cooperative
procured and distributed various food items to members, most of
which were sold under the brand name which it owned. 9 The joint
strength suggests that such was indeed not considered by the majority in reaching the result;
nor is it, therefore, relevant to the rule of reason. 433 U.S. at 64. Nonetheless, one wonders,
in the event restraints are imposed by market giants wielding near monopolistic market
shares, whether an evaluation of the independent effect of market dominance on interbrand
competition is proper under those circumstances, or whether the preferred tactic is an action
under § 2 of the Sherman Act for monopolization or attempted monopolization. See 15 U.S.C.
§ 2 (1976).
In connection, one matter that GTE Sylvania does resolve, at least implicitly, is the
irrelevancy of any degree-of-restrictiveness considerations with respect to location or cus-
tomer clauses and rule of reason scrutiny. See 433 U.S. at 58 n.29. Therefore, a plaintiff will
probably not be heard to argue unreasonableness grounded on the availability of a less
restrictive distributional restraint than the one adopted by the manufacturer, even if it could
have achieved the same efficiencies.
85. 433 U.S. at 46. See also note 55 and accompanying text supra.
86. 433 U.S. at 47-59; see notes 61-77 and accompanying text supra.
87. 405 U.S. 596 (1972).
88. Id. at 598.
89. Id. Only 10% of the total goods sold by members carried the "Topco" brand mark.
Id. at 600.
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venture buying and distribution scheme thus enabled member-
chains to achieve significant cost economies. At least part of these
savings were passed on to customers in the form of lower prices.
Unfortunately, as Topco members would soon discover, the fatal
error in the program was the association's exclusive division of geo-
graphic markets. Specifically, the joint venture called for the as-
signment of an exclusive district to each retailer through a system
of territorial licensing.9 0
The district court upheld the restrictions under a rule of reason
analysis, concluding that the anticompetitive effects of the terri-
torial restraints were outweighed by the enhanced ability of Topco
members to compete with the larger, burgeoning national chain
supermarkets."
On direct appeal, the Supreme Court reversed, finding the per
se principle in United States v. Sealy, Inc." controlling for self-
imposed territorial restraints by firms at the same level of produc-
tion. 3 Topco held that any horizontal division of geographic mar-
kets is per se illegal.
In so holding, the Supreme Court enumerated three reasons for
rejecting the rule of reason: (1) the inability of the judiciary to weigh
the destruction of intrabrand competition against the promotion of
interbrand competition;" (2) the desirability of leaving to Congress
the task of making such complex balancing judgments;" and (3) the
need to provide the business community with a rule enabling it to
predict with certainty what courses of conduct are impermissible."
Interestingly, in a terse and inconspicuous footnote, GTE
Sylvania reaffirmed the Topco rule, coupled with an unconvincing
attempt to distinguish and cast aside the horizontal market division
situation. 7 One doubts, however, the viability of the tripartite per
se rationale of Topco in light of the GTE Sylvania market-effect
analysis.
First, the GTE Sylvania Court obviously demonstrates an abil-
ity, if not an eagerness, to do precisely that which the Topco Court
declined to do-to sift through complex economic evidence in bal-
90. Id. at 601-03.
91. United States v. Topco Assoc., Inc., 319 F. Supp. 1031, .1043 (N.D. Ill. 1970), rev'd,
405 U.S. 596 (1972).
92. 388 U.S. 350 (1967). Coincidentally, Sealy was decided on the same day as Schwinn.
93. United States v. Topco Assoc., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 609 (1972).
94. Id. at 609-10.
95. Id. at 612.
96. Id. at 609 n.10.
97. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc. 433 U.S. at 58 n.28.
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ancing the costs and benefits of territorial restrictions." Second, the
GTE Sylvania decision explicitly refutes the contention that bal-
ancing intrabrand and interbrand competitive effects is not a proper
function of the judicial process, ironically enough citing Schwinn."
Third, responding to the policy argument that per se jurisprudence
provides certainty and guidance to the business community, GTE
Sylvania astutely counters: "Those advantages are not sufficient in
themselves to justify the creation of per se rules. If it were otherwise,
all of antitrust law would be reduced to per se rules, thus introduc-
ing an unintended and undesirable rigidity in the law." 10®
Potential ramifications upon horizontal marketing arrange-
ments aside, GTE Sylvania also sheds new light upon vertical re-
straints not specifically presented by Sylvania's distribution
scheme. The familiar problem of resale price restraints,0 ' heretofore
uniformly struck down by courts as per se illegal,"2 is now ripe for
reconsideration under the Court's "new economics of vertical rela-
tionships.' ' 3 Here again, however, GTE Sylvania made clear that
price maintenance was excepted from its rule of reason penumbra,
distinguishing price controls on the basis of precedent and policy.
The Court footnoted: "The per se illegality of price restrictions has
been established firmly for many years and involves significantly
different questions of analysis and policy.""'
Nonetheless, in a concurring opinion, Justice White character-
ized the "purported" distinction as being "as difficult to justify as
that of Schwinn under the terms of the majority's analysis."" 5 Not-
98. Id. at 50-59.
99. Id. at 57 n.27.
100. Id. at 50 n.16.
101. Price restraints imposed on distributors or retailers can take two forms: (1) mini-
mum price maintenance, whereby the ultimate seller is prohibited from selling the product
at a price lower than that set by the manufacturer; and conversely (2) maximum price
restraints, whereby price ceilings are set by the manufacturer. See generally Cassady,
Maintenance of Resale Prices by Manufacturers, 53 Q.J. EcoN. 454 (1939).
102. The rule is well established. Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co.,
220 U.S. 373 (1911) (minimum resale prices per se illegal); accord, Schwegmann Bros. v.
Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384 (1951); United States v. A. Schraders Son, Inc., 252
U.S. 85 (1920). The per se prohibition was later extended to maximum price restraints.
Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968). See also text accompanying notes 109-17 infra.
103. Continental T.V. Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. at 69 (White, J., concurring).
104. Id. at 51 n.18. The court continued: " 'Resale price maintenance is not designed to,
but almost invariably does in fact, reduce price competition not only among sellers of the
affected product, but quite as much between that product and competing brands.'" Id.
(quoting White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 268 (Brennan, J., concurring)).
Compare the articles and comments cited by the Court, 433 U.S. at 51 n.18 with Posner, The
Rule of Reason and the Economic Approach: Reflections on the Sylvania Decision, 45 U. CI.
L. REv. 1, 8 (1977).
105. 433 U.S. at 70.
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ing the trend in contemporary economic thought, 16 he pointed out
that the precise justification for nonprice vertical restraints relied
upon in the majority opinion are equally applicable to price re-
straints.' 7 Justice White concluded:
Indeed, the Court has already recognized that resale price main-
tenance may increase output by inducing "demand-creating ac-
tivity" by dealers (such as additional retail outlets, advertising
and promotion, and product servicing) that outweighs the addi-
tional sales that would result from lower prices brought about by
dealer price competition . . . . These same out-put enhancing
possibilities of nonprice vertical restraints are relied upon by the
majority as evidence of their "social utility and economic sound-
ness," . . . and as a justification for judging them under the rule
of reason. The effect, if not the intention, of the Court's opinion
is necessarily to call into question the firmly established per se
rule against price restraints. 18
Consequently, the continued viability of the per se rule against
maximum resale price maintenance, as recently reaffirmed in
Albrecht v. Herald Co.,'"0 is especially tenuous in the aftermath of
GTE Sylvania. In Albrecht, the Herald Company, publisher of the
St. Louis Globe-Democrat, sold newspapers to independent carriers
for distribution in exclusive territories.10 The newspapers were not
to be resold at a price higher than the suggested maximum."' Her-
ald, responding to one carrier's price hike above the suggested limit,
hired another firm to solicit that carrier's customers at the lower
price."12 The carrier, in turn, brought an antitrust action against
Herald. The district court found for the defendant, and the Eighth
Circuit affirmed. "1
The Supreme Court reversed. It reasoned that maximum as
well as minimum price fixing substitutes the perhaps erroneous
judgment of the seller for the competitive market forces."' In a
persuasive dissent, however, Justice Harlan argued that price ceil-
ings, unlike price floors, present possible justifications that should
be explored and not avoided by a mechanical per se rule. For
106. Id. Justice White cited as examples: Posner, supra note 2, at 292-93; Bork, supra
note 2, at 391-464.
107. 433 U.S. at 70.
108. Id. (citations omitted).
109. 390 U.S. 145 (1968).
110. Id. at 147.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Albrecht v. Herald Co., 367 F.2d 517 (8th Cir. 1966), rev'd, 390 U.S. 145 (1968).
114. 390 U.S. at 152.
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example, market forces might resuscitate a territorial monopoly,
thus price ceilings would be justified to prevent gouging."'
Clearly, even if the per se case against minimum price mainte-
nance were still accepted (which of course is subject to debate as
well)," ' maximum price setting, as Justice Harlan pointed out, is
an altogether different matter. Maximum price fixing limits profits
rather than competition among retailers. While an individual re-
tailer may lose his freedom to set prices, there is no corresponding
damage to price competition. Furthermore, if GTE Sylvania accur-
ately reflects the Court's new antitrust policy priorities by subordi-
nating the "autonomy of independent businessmen"" 7 to economic
efficiency," 8 the logical foundation of Albrecht now rests on quick-
sand.
Indeed the Court's extended economic analysis does suggest, at
least implicitly, a clarification of the fundamental priorities of anti-
trust policy. To this end, perhaps, the Court has moved closer to a
resolution of the confusion over the principal purpose of antitrust
regulation."' Observers have discovered a basic dichotomy of values
competing for judicial sanction' 20-the split occurring between effi-
ciency and nonefficiency considerations. 2'
Substantial authority exists supporting the notion that the an-
titrust laws were primarily intended to protect and to preserve the
115. Id. at 156-68.
116. See, e.g., Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. at 69 n.10; Posner,
supra note 2, at 292-98.
117. 433 U.S. at 53 n.21.
118. Id. "Efficiency" is used in this context to mean resource allocation unencumbered
by monopoly or other market distortions. Distribution of income considerations are not taken
into account. Justice Black has articulated this view:
The Sherman Act was designed to be a comprehensive charter of economic liberty
aimed at preserving free and unfettered competition as the rule of trade. It rests
on the premise that the unrestrained interaction of competitive forces will yield
the best allocation of our economic resources, the lowest prices, the highest qual-
ity and the greatest material progress, while at the same time providing an envi-
ronment conducive to the preservation of our democratic political and social
institutions.
Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958).
119. For a candid and insightful view of some of the policy dilemmas of antitrust enforce-
ment encountered by a former Director of the Bureau of Economics, Federal Trade Commis-
sion, see Scherer, Book Review, 86 YALE L.J. 974 (1977) (reviewing R. POSNER, ANTRrusT LAw,
AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE (1976)).
120. Id. at 979.
121. These are sometimes referred to as socio-political goals (in contradistinction to
efficiency considerations), such as the preservation of small business units and economic
liberty. See United States v. Topco Assoc., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972) (dubbing the
antitrust laws the "Magna Carta of free enterprise," designed to ensure protection of small
businessmen); Scherer, supra note 119, at 980-81.
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small business unit.2 ' Of course, the Sherman Act was enacted
during a period of great public anxiety over the concentration of
wealth and power in the hands of a few businessmen and small
trusts.'23 It has been contended that the construction of the antitrust
laws should embody a basic Jeffersonian philosophy-that is, the
preservation of the diverse, locally-competing, small-scale busi-
nesses. 2' Another legitimate antitrust policy consideration which
has been suggested 5 is the primacy of individual freedom of action
and economic liberty. Such was the underlying rationale of Schwinn
which incorporated into antitrust analysis a form of the ancient rule
against restraints on the alienation of property.' 6
There can be no question that, to a degree, such nonefficiency
values remain integral and laudable goals of antitrust policy. How-
ever, to the extent that efficiency considerations conflict with nonef-
ficiency values, GTE Sylvania states a clear preference for the for-
mer. By expressly and unequivocally proclaiming that "interbrand
competition . . . is the primary concern of antitrust law, "I" the
122. In United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 429 (2d Cir. 1945),
Judge Learned Hand stated: "Throughout the history of [the antitrust laws] it has been
constantly assumed that one of their purposes was to perpetuate and preserve, for its own
sake and in spite of possible cost, an organization of industry in small units which can
effectively compete with each other." Id.
It has been cogently argued, however, that the clear legislative intent behind antitrust
law is the promotion of efficiency. Bork, Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman
Act, 9 J.L. & EcoN. 7 (1976).
123. For a general discussion of the political and economic climate in the nineteenth
.century, see 1 J. voN KALINOWSKI, ANTITRUST LAws AND TADE RE UAnToN, §§ 2.01-3.02
(1969); Bork, supra note 122; Letwin, Congress and the Sherman Antitrust Law: 1887-1890,
23 U. Cm. L. REv. 221 (1956).
124. At least one segment of the antitrust laws, the antimerger statute, was expressly
designed to "aid in preserving small business as an important competitive factor in the
American economy." S. REP. No. 1775, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1950). That law is of course, §
7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976). Cf. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc.,
429 U.S. 477, 488 (1977); Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962) (the
antitrust laws were enacted for "the protection of competition, not competitors"). See also
Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 405 U.S. 562, 578 (1972); United States v. Von's Grocery
Co., 384 U.S. 270, 274-75 (1966); Fashion Originators' Guild of America, Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S.
457 (1941).
125. See, e.g., United States v. Topco Assoc., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610-11 (1972); Kiefer-
Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211, 213 (1951); Klor"s Inc. v. Broadway
Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1939); United States v. A. Schrader's Sons, Inc., 252 U.S.
85, 99-100 (1920); Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 406-08
(1911). For a more complete sampling of authorities forwarding the economic freedom policy,
see Judge Browning's dissent in GTE Sylvania Inc. v. Continental T.V., Inc., 537 F.2d 980,
1019-22 (9th Cir. 1976) (en banc). See generally Blake & Jones, Toward a Three-Dimensional
Antitrust Policy, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 422 (1965).
126. United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 380 (1967). See also notes
34-36 and accompanying text supra.
127. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. at 52 n.19.
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GTE Sylvania Court holds that fostering a competitive economy, in
the interest of consumer welfare, 12s is the principal purpose of anti-
trust regulation. Irrespective of one's views regarding the primacy
of allocative efficiency over other socio-political concerns, there is
certainly a desirable predictive value in the consistency of judicial
interpretation. To the extent that GTE Sylvania signals a clear
priority among competing policy choices, the sometimes inconsist-
ent ratio decidendi running through much antitrust jurisprudence
may now be cured. Courts, therefore, should accept GTE Sylvania
as a mandate for enforcing the antitrust statutes in a fashion which
ultimately strengthens and promotes our nation's economic welfare
through a healthy and competitive free enterprise system.
128. For an excellent analysis of the social costs of monopoly, see R. POSNER, ANTITRUST
LAW, AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE (1976).
